[fw-wiz] Inappropriate TCP Resets Considered Harmful
Sat, 2 Jun 2001 15:40:51 +1000
(Reposted because the anti-virus software DID do silly things with
attachments. - We have since upgraded from that software.)
(Hoping that the organisations Anti-Virus software won't do silly things
with attachments this time :-)
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Ben Nagy [mailto:email@example.com]
> Sent: Tuesday, 15 May 2001 4:02 PM
> Subject: RE: [fw-wiz] Inappropriate TCP Resets Considered Harmful
> > One family of opinion states that the firewall should provide
> > an absolute
> > minimum of information regarding its configuration and state.
I should say here that I am of the school who believe in "Defense In Depth".
(I was recently asked to build a 'secure' data centre, and my response was
"Against who am I defending, and how quickly must they be repelled in a
physical attack? Security Agencies, Professionals, Corporate Espionage,
Talented Amateurs, or Media?" My response was "up to 50kUSD attacks, and 10
minutes unapposed access".)
While a determined/skilled/cash-ready attacker can gain access to (almost)
all of the information necessary to perform the attack, I would prefer that
they have to spend the time/effort/cash to gain it, as that gives me that
much longer to identify that an attack is in planning/progress, and
This is good, solid, dependable, and time-tested information/physical
security technique. (I think that a lot of "Computer Security Professionals"
disregard (or are unable to obtain) the lessons of the physical/military
security environment. This is a real pity, as the concepts are still valid
in the new realm.
> Being able to have your firewall fingerprinted is probably
> not optimal, but
> not an overriding concern, IMO. Going too far down that path leads to
> "Security by Obscurity" sophistry.
I don't believe that obscurity is a valid security concept, however
"information hiding" (obscuring) CAN be used to increase security.
(Otherwise pre-shared secrets wouldn't work...)
> > From a security point of view, I believe that it is perfectly
> > valid for a
> > firewall to deny or reject any traffic that is not
> > _PRE-APPROVED_. i.e. if
> > the firewall receives ECN traffic, and the organisation has
> > not said "We
> > want to allow ECN", then the firewall administrator would be
> > negligent if
> > this traffic was not dropped.
> I agree. This seems to be a common opinion among firewall
And not just firewall people. Talk to any trained Security Officer, and they
will tell you that the Primary Tenet of Operational Security (in a security
sensitive situation) is "Prevent that which is not explicitly allowed".
[Deem the standard disclaimer about the inverse situation included]
> That would tend to lead me to assume that the only reason that
> ECN works for such a large percentage of hosts is because many
> firewalls so not adequately enforce RFC compliance in the TCP
> stream, not because the administrators have taken a lenient
> security stance.
Some-Some. My experience would tend to say that for "Highly-Competant
Security Professionals", that is the case, however I have found that the
vast majority of Firewall Administrators are NOT Security Professionals....
> [Crispin votes for TCP RST as a response to ECN-TCP packets]
> > (Mind you, the argument changes when talking non-TCP :-)
> OK - what's your pick for non-TCP?
The RST mechanism is only appropriate when dealing with TCP streams. My
basic argument doesn't change: "I believe that session/connection/packet
rejections should be handled in the same way regardless of whether it was a
'Deny by rule', 'Inappropriate Options', or 'Host/Service not available'.
(Here is where I wish I could find my copy of Internetworking... [Comer].)
UDP doesn't have a RST mechanism.
I would propose ICMP Port Unreachable for all cases.
ICMP doesn't really require a RST mechanism.
I guess would suggest either no response, or one of the
IP other protocols
<?help? Don't have an answer for this, although I am looking...>
> That's going to be relevant, as well, and variation in the
> handling of ECN for other IP protocols is almost certainly
> going to lead to fingerprinting heaven.
What a wonderful thought. <wry grimace>
DeMorgan Information Security Specialists
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