[fw-wiz] Firewall rules order and performance
kkadow at gmail.com
Wed Jul 29 10:36:07 EDT 2009
A good example of this is the BIND9 bug released yesterday. A very
good firewall has a DNS proxy and denies malformed packets, or can be
set to filter out 'nsupdate' type packets.
Even "iptables" can be set to drop these packets, with a one-line rule change.
On 7/28/09, K K <kkadow at gmail.com> wrote:
> Only if your "firewall" is a lowly stateful inspection packet filter,
> and is not deeply aware of the higher level protocols...
> The idea behind "deep inspection" and protocol validating proxy
> firewalls was in part to filter out attacks before they reach
> vulnerable servers/clients. They do make the attacker's job more
> On 7/28/09, Eric Gearhart <eric at nixwizard.net> wrote:
>> On Mon, Jul 27, 2009 at 1:21 AM, Jean-Denis Gorin<jdgorin at computer.org>
>>> Who remember that firewalls (as application gateways) was designed to
>>> solve (or
>>> to ease a lot) the patch management problem?
>>> Now, we are back to patch management as the solution for all problems
>>> dumb people (managers, marketers, buyers, system admins, network admins,
>>> developers, or whatever fit your situation) are unable (or unwilling) to
>>> understand what is a firewall, and what is it due for...
>> Part of the problem with your argument is that in order for e,g, a web
>> server to be reached, port 80 (and maybe port 443) have to be allowed
>> through the firewall. That fact alone means that the webservers have
>> to be patched, because as long as the firewall is allowing legitimate
>> traffic through, it could also be allowing malicious traffic
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>> firewall-wizards at listserv.icsalabs.com
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